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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the net cost of universal service obligations in the postal sector after 
full  liberalization  and  the  potential  burden  they  represent  for  the  universal  service 
provider. It considers various interpretations of what an ‚unfair burden‛ might be and 
discusses the competitive impact of corresponding compensation scenarios by means of a 
stylized theoretical model with endogenous entry and coverage decisions. 
JEL classification: H42, L51 
1.  Introduction 
The financing of universal service provision in the postal sector has traditionally relied on 
granting the provider a reserved area. The need for alternative funding sources after full 
liberalization has increased the interest of regulators and the public in knowing the cost of 
universal service provision as the universal service provider (USP) should be correctly 
compensated for its burden. This implies knowing the net cost of The USO as measured 
by the profitability cost approach pioneered by Panzar (2000) and Cremer et al. (2000). 
The net cost of universal service obligations (USO) according to profitability cost is the 
difference in the USP’s profit with and without these obligations.2 This approach has been 
practically implemented in a number of countries, e.g. in Denmark ( cf.  Copenhagen 
Economics, 2008), Norway (cf. Bergum, 2008), in the UK (cf. Frontier Economics, 2008), in 
the US (cf. Cohen et al., 2010). In all of these examples, the costing of universal services 
has been treated separately from its financing. 
Only recently it has been argued that the market structure and the actual cost  or the 
burden of USO are directly related to regulation and the funding mecha nism in place. 
Jaag et al. (2009 ) provide an outline  of how changes of the USP’s cost structure affect 
pricing,  market  equilibria  and  hence  indirectly  the  net  cost.  They  also  show  that 
individual elements or dimensions of the USO cannot be priced separately as this would 
either result in inconsistent or biased cost estimates. Boldron et al. (2009) argue that the 
challenge  of  establishing  a  funding  mechanism  is  that  the  market  structure  and  the 
effective  cost/burden  of  USO  are  endogenous  to  regulation  and  funding  mechanisms. 
Similar points are raised in Jaag and Trinkner (2009) and Borsenberger et al. (2010). While 
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2 Annex I of the Third Postal Directive defines the net cost calculation as follows: ‚The net cost of universal 
service obligations is any cost related to and necessary for the operation of the universal service provision. 
The net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated, as the difference between the net cost for a 
designated universal service provider of operating with the universal service obligations and the same postal 
service provider operating without the universal service obligations.‛ 2 
the former discusses the competitive impact of various cost sharing and compensation 
mechanisms on the competitive equilibrium, the latter focuses on the appropriate tax base 
for a sharing mechanism. Jaag (2008) discusses the importance of a thorough definition of 
the counterfactual scenario  – whether there is no USO at all or universal services are 
provided by an alternative operator – and its impact on the net cost of the USO. 
Based  on  these  considerations,  it  is  apparent  that  merely  calculating  the  net  cost  of 
universal service obligation may not be adequate when devising the fair compensation for 
a universal service provider. Consequently, the Third Postal Directive 2008/6/EC in Article 
7 states that:  
‚Where a Member State determines that the universal service obligations *<+ entail a net cost 
*<+  and  represent  an  unfair  financial  burden  on  the  universal  service  provider(s),  it  may 
introduce: 
  a mechanism to compensate the undertaking(s) concerned from public funds; or 
  a mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of the universal service obligations between 
providers of services and/or users.‛ 
Hence, a compensation for the USP may only be introduced if the USO entails a net cost 
and represents an unfair burden. While there is quite a comprehensive literature on the 
costing of the USO, there has been little discussion so far as to how exactly define an 
unfair burden. That is the focus of this paper. 
In the following, we consider three main compensation means  for the USP which are 
compliant with the EC Directive: 3 
State funding – The USP’s net cost of providing universal services is reimbursed with 
funds provided by the general government budget. In this scheme, no operator in the 
postal market contributes specifically to the funding of the USO. 
Compensation fund – All operators contribute to a compensation fund with a uniform 
tax. The USP’s net costs are reimbursed by the collected funds. In such a system, the USP 
has to partly compensate his net cost himself.  
“Pay  or  play”  –  Operators  that  provide  universal  services  (‚play‛)  are  exempt  from 
contributing to the compensation fund (‚pay‛). 
We discuss the implication of these funding mechanisms on the fairness of a USO burden. 
The topic strongly relates to EU state aid rules with which any compensation that involves 
some form of government funding needs to comply.4 According to Article 87(1) of the EC 
Treaty, any transfer of state resources that is selective, gives an advantage to the recipient 
over its rivals, and distorts competition is classified as illegal state aid. This would 
certainly be the case with state funding of the USO as discussed above. In the Services of 
General Economic Interest (SGEI) framework, however, financial support from the state to 
the USP is only considered state aid if a set of four cumulative criteria specified in the 
Altmark case are not met:5 The recipient of state funds must be subject to a clearly defined 
USO, the parameters by which the compensation is calculated must be defined ex ante in 
an objective and transparent manner, the compensation does not exceed the costs incurred 
in delivering the public service obligations taking into account the relevant receipts and a 
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4 Cf. e.g. Oxera (2007) or Holzleitner (2010). 
5 Cf. Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH und Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg gegen 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747. 3 
reasonable profit, and the level of compensation must be determined on the basis of the 
cost  of  an  efficient  operator.  The  various  notions  of  an  unfair  burden  which  will  be 
discussed below perform differently with respect to these criteria. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses a simple stylized 
model of the postal sector which allows to discuss the USO, its net cost and its financing. 
In section 3, various criteria for assessing the (un)fairness of a burden and their effect on 
the operators’ profits are presented. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  A Model of Competition in the Postal Sector  
Our model approach is similar to the one in Valletti et al. (2002):  There are two firms 
each  one  offering  postal  services  which  are  imperfect  substitutes.  There  is  a 
continuum   of different markets, where   is the size of the total market. We use 
a geographical interpretation of a market, such that market   stands for a local delivery 
route. Hence, the market can be divided into segments by region of delivery. If firm   
decides to enter a certain market   it has to pay the fixed cost6 associated to that market 
, where we assume that  . 
For the sake of simplicity, we make the following further assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Markets are independent of each other. This implies that the competitive 
situation in one market does not affect the cost structure or demand in another market. 
Assumption 2: There are two symmetric operators. They possess the same technology 
(cost function) and compete in horizontally differentiated products. 
Assumption  3:  The  sequence  of  decisions  is  as  follows:  First,  a  profit-maximizing 
incumbent chooses its optimum market coverage (geographical area coverage). Second, 
an entrant (competitor) sets its optimum coverage. Third, both operators set their price(s) 
for each of the delivery markets. 
Marginal  cost is  constant  and  by  assumption 2  the  same for  both  operators.  In every 
market   each operator makes a gross profit (or surplus) amounting to  .7 Because all 
markets share the same demand characteristics and variable costs, the equilibrium price s 
in each market and therefore also   depend only on the number of competitors.8 Typically, 
in the postal sector,  while   This implies that some regions 
are attractive to serve while others are not and market entry will generally occur, albeit 
not with full coverage. This is e.g. the case in Sweden where the incumbent’s biggest rival 
Bring CityMail delivers only in the most densely populated areas. 
From the perspective of operators, local delivery markets are ranked by increasing order 
of cost. Without USO, operators begin to cover the most densely populated areas and 
continue to cover less densely areas as long as it is profitable. Hence, each operator starts 
offering services from the market with the highest profit and leaves no gaps between 
served markets. If operator   serves all markets   its total profit will be  
                                                       
6 In the following, we will refer to the fixed cost associated with serving a market as ‚marginal fixed cost‛ in 
the sense that it is the cost incurred when an operator extends its regional presence marginally. 
7 Note that the surplus in each market results from selling a range of products in that market. It does not 
matter how many products are concerned (or e.g. whether or not they are in the product scope of the USO). 
8 There is no reason for price differentiation within markets if same number of operators is the same. 4 
 
Solving the model backwards yields for the optimum market coverages of the entrant and 
the incumbent, respectively: 
 
 
Due to the assumptions made, total cost is convex. This implies that only one type of 
asymmetric equilibrium can arise in which one operator is bigger than the other. Here, 
due to sequence in assumption 3, the entrant’s coverage,   is lower than the incumbent’s, 
.9 This is due to the marginal surplus in the monopolistic segment being larger than in 
the  duopolistic  segment :  There  is  a  mutual  business  stealing  (quant ity  effect)  and 
competitive pressure on prices in the duopoly region (price effect) such that 
 
Hence, in  the  absence  of  a  universal  service  obligation,  the  specific  cost  structure 
together with the market penetration decisions result in a natural segmentation of the 
entire market into three regions (cf. Figure 1):10 
(1) In attractive market segments (e.g. densely populated delivery areas with low wage 
levels), it is feasible for both companies to operate in parallel (‚competitive region‛, 
). 
(2) In less attractive local delivery markets (e.g. semi-rural areas), an operator can make a 
profit  only  if  there  is  no  competitor.  Hence,  there  will  be  a  monopolistic  operator  in 
equilibrium (‚monopolistic region‛,  ). 
(3) In the least attractive  local delivery markets (e.g. rural  and / or high wage  areas), 
marginal fixed costs are higher than marginal surplus, such that no operator serves this 








Figure 1: The Segmentation of the Market for Mail. 
                                                       
9 In our model it is the sequence of decisions that results in the incumbent always serving at equilibrium a 
larger proportion of the market. This sequence reflects that the incumbent operator has traditionally been 
serving all markets due to the USO.  
10 Cf. Jaag (2009) for an in-depth discussion of such market segmentation. 
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The horizontal lines at s and s’ in Figure 1 represent the marginal gross surplus in each 
market with two and one operators, respectively. The increasing straight line illustrates 
the marginal fixed cost associated with serving market r. In our model, we do not assume 
a concrete functional form of the cost function. 
We define the USO in line with the Third Postal Directive to consist of the obligation to 
serve all regions up to  .11 However, there is no uniform tariff constraint. 12 Hence the 
introduction of a USO forces the USP to also serve areas   in which the marginal 
cost exceeds the marginal surplus from extending market coverage.13 This replaces the 
operator’s  coverage  decision  in  the  sequence  of  decisions  and  potentially  necessitates 
some kind of compensation. For the ease of analysis, we make a simplifying assumption 
on the financing of such compensation: 
Assumption 4: If operators contribute to compensating the net cost of universal service 
provision, the necessary funds are collected through profit taxation. 
Compared  to  other  taxation  schemes  (e.g.  based  on  turnover  or  per  unit),  this 
considerably simplifies our analysis as the operators’ market coverage decisions are not 
distorted by the contribution to the USO fund.14 
Assumptions  1-4  allow  us  to define  the profits in each of the three market segments 
separately: 
The two operators’ profit in the competitive market segment is equal to 
 
The profit in the market segment which is served by only one operator in equilibrium is 
equal to 
 
The loss of the universal service provider in the market segment which would not be 
served in the absence of a USO is 
 
Hence, the entrant’s total profit without USO is equal to area   in Figure 1, 
 
                                                       
11 Art. 3 ‚Member States shall ensure that users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the permanent 
provision of a postal service of specified quality at all  points in their territory at affordable prices for all 
users.‛ 
12 Cf. Panzar (2008) who discusses the role of postal rates on the costing of the USO. 
13 Other interpretations of the USO are conceivable: If the USO is only concerned with regions which would be 
unserved without regulation, its scope would be reduced but its burden on the USP may be heavier as it 
would not automatically consolidate the USP’s position in the monopolistic region. Jaag (2008) discusses this 
issue in detail. 
14 A downsize of the profit tax approach is that compared to other funding approaches, as e.g. unit taxes or 
turnover taxes, it may lead to more difficulties in allocating the contributions across operators due to the risk 
of inconsistent accounting policies being adopted. Cf. Borsenberger et al. (2010) and Jaag and Trinkner (2009) 
for a discussion of the effect of various taxation schemes on the costing and financing of the USO.  6 
The incumbent’s profit without USO is equal to the areas   in Figure 1, 
 
Assuming  that  the  incumbent  will  be  the  USP,  its  profit  with  USO  but  without 
compensation is equal to 
 
As discussed above, we consider three potential financing mechanisms in case there is a 
net cost which constitutes an unfair burden: 
1) External financing (‚ext‛): The burden is financed by state funding; hence, there are no 
specific taxes imposed on postal operators,  . 
2) Everyone pays (‚fund‛): Both operators contribute equally to a universal services fund 
. The total tax base equals the two operators’ joint profits,  . 
3) Pay  or  play  (‚pop‛):  Only  the  competitor  contributes  to  the  funding  of  the  USO, 
, the total tax base is equal to its profit   
Hence, after compensation, the two operators’ profits are respectively equal to 
 
 
 is the gross transfer the USP receives as compensation. According to the definition in 
Annex I of the Third Postal Directive, the net cost of USO is therefore equal to 
 
The Third Postal Directive also imposes rules on accounting separation as a basis for the 
calculation of the USO net cost (Art. 14, Para. 2): 
‚The universal service provider(s) shall keep separate accounts within their internal accounting 
systems in order to clearly distinguish between each of the services and products which are part 
of the universal service and those which are not. This accounting separation shall be used as an 
input when Member States calculate the net cost of the universal service. Such internal 
accounting systems shall operate on the basis of consistently applied and objectively justifiable 
cost accounting principles.‛ 
In the calculation of the USO net cost, according to Annex I of the Third Postal Directive, 
the profit level of the entire operator is relevant, not the profit of individual services. Our 
model shows that in general, in order to calculate the USO net cost, there is no need to 
distinguish between each of the services and products which are part of the universal 
service and those which are not. However, there is another need for separation, namely 
between     and  , i.e. between products or services which are affected by the USO and 
those that are not. There are two ways by which a non-USO product or service may be 
affected by the USO: First, there may be economies of scope between USO and non-USO 
products, such that e.g. with a USO, non-USO products are voluntarily offered in region   
which would not be profitable in the absence of the USO. Second, if there was a per-unit 
or turnover tax on all products to augment a USO fund, also non-USO products would 
have to contribute to the funding of the USO. 
It is apparent that there is an inherent difficulty in the calculation of the USO net cost due 
to  non-observability:  The  competitor’s  profit    is  an  ‚existing  number‛  which  is 
observable (at least by itself and its shareholders). The USP’s profit   ‚exists‛ as 
well.  Therefore,  the  difference  between  the  two,  ,  in  principle  can  be  calculated. 7 
However,   and   are not observable separately and cannot be computed directly as they 
exist only in the counterfactual scenario without USO. We will return to this issue in the 
context  of  the  approaches  to  the  definition  of an  unfair  burden  discussed in  the  next 
section. 
3.  Approaches to the Notion of Unfair Burden 
With  respect  to  the  notion  of  an  unfair  burden,  there  are  then  two  fundamental  but 
distinct questions to be answered: 
1)  When is there a burden? What is the criterion for implementing a compensation or 
cost sharing mechanism? 
2)  What  is  the  appropriate  compensation  such  that  there  is  no  remaining  unfair 
burden? 
The net transfer to compensate the USP is 
 
If the USO net cost and its financing are calculated sequentially, this net transfer does not 
take into account its financing mechanism. Hence, the relevant criterion for compensation 
is met ex ante (but not necessarily ex post) which helps answering the first question. If 
there is an integrated calculation of the net cost of the USO and its financing, the net 
transfer meets the relevant criterion ex post (but not necessarily ex ante) which answers 
the second question. 
The paper adopts four different criteria to assess the (un)fairness of a burden and hence 
the appropriateness and the level of compensation (cf. Figure 2). Both questions raised 
above will be considered separately. The first criterion sets the USP’s profit in relation to 
its profit without universal service provision. The second criterion considers the USP’s 
absolute profit level. The third criterion compares the USP’s profit to its competitor’s. The 








Figure 2: Approaches to the Notion of Unfair Burden. 
Criterion 1: Absolute Net Cost Level 
According to criterion 1, universal service provision imposes an unfair burden if it 
reduces the USP’s profit compared to a situation without USO. 
This criterion matches the view taken by CERP (2008). However, in their view there is 
only an unfair burden if the net cost exceeds a certain threshold. Hence, if net costs are 
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negligible, their calculation and compensation is to be avoided.15 This criterion allows for 
a compensation of  the  net cost irrespective  of the  actual or  hypothesized  competitive 
situation in the postal sector.  
Ex ante perspective 
Assuming that the USO net cost exceeds a certain threshold, from an ex ante perspective, 
the USP should receive a transfer such that its resulting profit is equal to its profit without 
USO. Hence, the necessary gross transfer   is to be set such that 
 
Superscript m indicates the source of the USO financing and whether the compensation is 
devised ex ante or ex post.16 If this transfer is financed by state funds, the USP’s loss in the 
least  attractive  region  is  just  offset  by  the  transfer;  the  competitor’s  profit  remains 
unchanged. If there is a pay or play mechanism, the transfer must be collected from the 
competitor with its profit as the relevant tax base: 
 
Hence, the tax rate in that scenario is 
 
If  there  is  a  fund  to  which  all  operators  contribute,  the  tax  base  is  the  sum  of  both 
operators’ profits. Hence, the tax rate is determined by  
 
which results in 
 
Of course, if the USP contributes to financing its own net cost, the criterion by which the 
unfairness of its burden is assessed may not be met from an ex post perspective. 
Ex post perspective 
In order for the criterion to be met ex post, the USP’s profit with and without universal 
service  provision  must  be  equal  independently  of  the  financing  mechanism  in  place. 
Hence, 
 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result obtained by 
setting the transfer ex ante. With a pay or play mechanism, the tax rate is now determined 
as 
                                                       
15 CERP (2008) states: „If the reference scenario does not vary fundamentally from the scenario with USO the 
difference can be ignored. Then the cost of administrating a compensation mechanism probably would cost 
more than it would help the USP‛ (p.20). It further argues that ‚If the current universal service provision 
exceeds the requirements of the USO, the designated USO doesn’t carry a burden‛ (p.20). This is certainly 
true, but in that case there is no net cost either and the whole point appears to be moot. 
16 In order to keep notation simple, in the following we suppress indices referring to the scenarios we discuss. 
These differ in two dimensions: The criterion by which the unfairness of a burden is assessed and whether 
that assessment is ex ante or ex post.  9 
 
Similarly, with a compensation fund in place, the tax rate is calculated by 
 
Table 1 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the USO net 
cost according to criterion 1 with external fund, a pay or play mechanism and a USO fund 
with tax rates set ex ante as well as a pay or play mechanism with tax rates set ex post, 
respectively. Note that with external funding, the joint profit of both operators equals 
 which is also the joint profit without USO. If the USO net cost is financed within 
the sector, the joint profit is  , irrespective of whether a fund or pay or play 
mechanism is in place. With a fund and from an ex ante perspective, the net cost –  is 
shared  among  the  operators  according  to  their  profit  levels:  the  USP  bears  a  fraction 
 and the competitor bears a fraction  . From an ex post perspective, the ‚pay 
or play‛ and fund-based financing mechanisms are equivalent, as the net compensations 
received by the USP are the same by definition. Of course, as soon as the competitor’s 
profit turns negative, the financing mechanism breaks down, as the competitor will not 
remain active in the market.17  
m  USP profit    Competitor profit   
ext     
pop ex ante     
fund ex ante     
pop ex post     
fund ex post     
Table 1: Results for criterion 1 – absolute net cost level. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor resulting 
from a compensation of the USO net costs according to criterion 1.18 The horizontal axis 
shows net costs (- ) ranging from 0 to 30 .   and   are kept constant such that overall 
profits in the market are  decreasing in net costs. Compensation by state funding is not 
displayed, as it has a trivial effect on the operators’ profits. If the compensation is such 
that the net cost is compensated with a pay or play mechanism and correctly from an ex 
ante perspective, the resulting burden on the USP is always equal to zero. It is also fair ex 
post. If the USP is compensated by a fund to which both operators contribute such that 
the criterion is met ex ante, there are two effects involved. Firstly, The USP contributes 
according to its profit, which is declining in the USO net costs. Secondly, the competitor’s 
profit and therefore also its contribution increases relative to the USP’s. As the total tax 
                                                       
17 Correctly, the profit levels reported in Tables 1 to 4 would have to have a lower bound at zero. 
18 Parameter values are:  ,    . The profit levels with external funding are not displayed 
as they are obviously constant in changes of   (cf. Table 1). 10 
base is decreasing in the net cost, this implies that the net transfer the USP receives from 
the competitor increases if the net costs are high.19 
The shaded area in  Figure 3 shows the range of net cost s which represents an unfair 
burden from an ex ante perspective. Concretely, in the displayed example, the net cost  is 
considered to represent an unfair burden for values of  .20 
 
Figure 3: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to criterion 1. 
Compensation  of  the  USO  net  cost  according  to  this  criterion  raises  a  number  of 
implementation issues: 
If there is a threshold, as in the CERP interpretation: Who determines that threshold – the 
USP, the law or the national regulatory authority? 
What  is  the  necessary  data  to  determine  a  fair  compensation?  Is  there  a  need  for 
accounting  separation?  In  our  model,  there  is  no  need  to  separate  between  universal 
services and others, but between the unserved market segment and the others. 
If compensated according to this criterion, the USP faces no incentives to minimize its net 
cost,  i.e.  to  maximize  efficiency  in  the  provision  of  services  only  offered  in  the  USO 
scenario.  If  there  is  a  fund  with  ex  ante  defined  contributions,  the  USP  is  even 
incentivized to increase the net cost, as it is overcompensated by its competitor.21 
Criterion 2: Absolute Profit Level 
According to criterion 2, universal service provision imposes an unfair burden if the 
USP’s profit is negative.22 
Hence, universal services should not be offered at a loss. The implicit normative reference 
behind this criterion could be the assumption that competition in fully liberalized postal 
markets results in zero profits of all operators in the absence of universal service 
obligations. In this context, Boldron et al. (2009) rely on the concept of ‚inequity‛ and 
                                                       
19 The effect that the USP’s profit may be increasing in the USO net cost is due to the operators’ profits (wich 
decrease in the USO net cost) being the tax base for the USO fund. With a per-unit or turnover based tax, 
results may be different. However, the model would be much more less transparent, as   and   and 
therefore also  ,  , and   would depend on the USO financing.  
20 This threshold is set arbitrarily for illustration. 
21 If contributions were not on a profit basis but per piece or by turnover, this effect would be even stronger, as 
it would also degrade the entrant’s optimum market coverage. 
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argue: ‚The burden is unfair if the USP’s market power is not sufficient to counterbalance 
the weight of the USO to maintain a reasonable profit‛ (p. 68). This approach is close to 
the interpretation of an unfair burden by De Donder et al. (2010) who define it as the 
inability to support the USO financially. Criterion 2 is close to the mentioning of a 
‚reasonable profit‛ in Annex I of the Third Postal Directive:  
‚The calculation shall take into account all other relevant elements, including any intangible 
and market benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to provide universal 
service, the entitlement to a reasonable profit and incentives for cost efficiency.‚ 
Ex ante perspective23 
From an ex ante perspective, the gross transfer   which is necessary for the USP to 
break even, is calculated as: 
 
If this transfer is financed by state funds, the USP’s overall loss or profit is just offset by 
the  transfer (which  may  well  be negative).24  If  there is a pay or play mechanism, the 
transfer must be collected from the competitor with its profit representing the relevant tax 
base: 
 
If everyone contributes to the fund, the tax base is enlarged by the USO’s profit, such that:  
 
Ex post perspective  
From an ex post perspective, the USP is supposed to just break even, 
 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result obtained by 
setting the transfer ex ante. With a pay or play mechanism, the tax rate is determined as  
 
With a compensation fund, it is 
 
Note that as long as  tax rates are negative. Table 2 shows the operators’ 
profit levels resulting from a compensation of the USO net cost according to criterion 2. 
m  USP profit    Competitor profit   
ext     
pop ex ante     
                                                       
23 In order to simplify notation, we again suppress indices for the relevant criterion and the (ex post or ex ante) 
perspective. 
24 Note that in our model context, this implies that there may not only be an unfair burden, but possibly also 
an unfair profit which is treated symmetrically. 12 
fund ex ante     
pop ex post     
fund ex post     
Table 2: Results for criterion 2 – absolute profit level. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor resulting 
from a compensation of the USO net costs according to criterion 2.25 Because the USP’s 
profit is set to zero from an ex ante perspective, the entire industry profit accrues to the 
competitor. This is declining in the amount of the USO net cost. If the USP is compensated 
by a fund to which both operators contribute such that the criterion is met ex ante, the tax 
rate is negative if   Then, ex post the USP retains part of its profit from the 
competitive and the monopolistic regions. If the net cost exceeds the profit in these two 
regions, the tax rate becomes positive which implies that the USP is a net receiver of 
transfers and that it profits from an increase in the net cost. 
The  shaded  area  in  Figure  4  shows  the  range  of  net  cost  which  represents  an  unfair 
burden from an ex ante perspective. Concretely, the net cost is considered to represent an 
unfair burden if  . 
If the USP’s compensation equals the burden calculated according to this approach, there 
is no need to compute the USO net cost in the first place: Note that in Table 2 it suffices to 
know   and ( ). There is no need to know   separately. Hence, this approach 
undermines  the  elegance  of  the  pure  net  cost  approach  which  could  do  without 
attributing joint and common costs to certain products. If the USP’s compensation equals 
the burden calculated according to this approach, there is no need to compute the USO 
net cost in the first place. 
 
Figure 4: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to criterion 2. 
Even though the USP is supposed to break even, it makes a profit in the scenario in which 
it contributes to a fund and the contribution is determined ex ante. The reason is that the 
USP’s contribution to the fund is not considered when the tax rate is determined. For low 
values of the USO net cost, the USP’s profit before contributing to the fund is positive, and 
                                                       
25 Again, parameter values are:  ,   and on the horizontal axis  . The profit levels with 
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consequently, the tax rate – which is set ex ante such that the USP just breaks even – is 
negative. For high values of the USO net cost, the USP’s profit before contributing to the 
fund is negative, while the tax rate is positive. Hence, it is overcompensated because, 
again, its (negative) contribution is not taken into account in the determination of the tax 
rate. 
We  have  so  far  assumed  that  the  entire  operator’s  profit  is  regulated  to  zero  profit. 
Alternative extents of the USP’s operations that are regulated to just break even may be 
the 
  provision of individual products within the scope of universal services; 
  provision of universal services as a whole; 
  business unit providing universal services; 
  entire company. 
The choice of the relevant business unit very much affects the USP’ incentives to minimize 
costs associated with the operations relevant in the zero-profit regulation resulting from 
this criterion. 
Criterion 3: Absolute Difference to Competitors’ Profit Levels 
According to criterion 3, universal service provision imposes an unfair burden if the 
USP’s profit is lower than its competitor’s. 
Hence, the USP should not be worse off than  its competitor. According compensation 
results in a leveling of pre-existing differences among operators. In real postal markets, 
such differences are possibly due to asymmetric competition as a result of differences in 
reputation  or  asymmetric  cost  structures,  asymmetric  strategic  behavior  related  to  the 
dynamics of their entry decisions or the USO or just asymmetric management capabilites. 
Hence, it is difficult to assess whether asymmetries are really unfair. 
Ex ante perspective 
From an ex ante perspective, the gross transfer   which is necessary for the USP’s profit 
to equal its competitor’s is calculated as: 
 
If this transfer is financed by state funds, the difference in the operators’ profits is just 
offset by the transfer; again, the competitor’s profit remains unchanged. In case there is a 
pay or play mechanism, the transfer must be collected from the competitor with its profit 
being the relevant tax base: 
 
If everyone contributes to the fund, the tax base is the total of the two operators’ profits, 
such that:  
 
Ex post perspective 
From an ex post perspective, the USP’s profit is supposed to equal its competitor’s, 
 14 
In the case of external financing, the resulting equilibrium matches the result obtained by 
setting  the  transfer  ex  ante.  However,  with  a  pay  or  play  mechanism,  the  tax  rate  is 
determined as  
 
With a compensation fund, it is 
 
Table 3 Table 1 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the 
USO net cost according to criterion 3. 
m  USP profit    Competitor profit   
ext     
pop ex ante     
fund ex ante     
pop ex post     
fund ex post     
Table 3: Results for criterion 3 – absolute difference in profit levels. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor resulting 
from a compensation of the USO net costs according to criterion  3.26 From an ex ante 
perspective with a pay or play mechanism, as the USP’s profit is fixed, increases in the net 
cost are fully borne by the competitor. The effects of a fund are the same as discussed 
under  criterion  1.  If  the  compensation  is  calculated  from  an  ex  post  perspective,  the 
burden resulting from the net costs is evenly distributed among the two operators. 
The  shaded  area  in  Figure  5  shows  the  range  of  net  cost  which  represents  an  unfair 
burden  from  an  ex  ante  perspective.  Concretely,  the  net  cost  is  considered  an  unfair 
burden if  . 
If the compensation of the USO net cost is implemented according to this criterion, the 
incentive problem associated with the first two approaches discussed is now extended to 
the USP’s competitor, as the compensation is contingent on its own profit as well. 
                                                       
26 Again, parameter values are:  ,   and on the horizontal axis  . The profit levels with 
external funding are not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of   (cf. Table 3). 15 
 
Figure 5: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to criterion 3. 
Criterion 4: Relative Difference to Competitors’ Profit Levels 
According to criterion 4, universal service provision imposes an unfair burden if it 
reduces the USP’s profit compared to a situation without USO by more than the 
competitor’s profit is reduced due to its contribution to USO funding. 
Hence the USP should not be worse off by more than its competitors due to its universal 
service provision. 
Ex ante perspective 
From an ex ante perspective, the competitor’s profit is unaffected by the USO. Hence, the 
gross  transfer  ,  which  is  necessary  for  the  USP’s  profit  difference  compared  to  a 
situation without USO to be zero, is calculated as: 
 
Note that this is the same condition as under criterion 1. 
Ex post perspective  
From  an  ex  post  perspective,  the  USP’s  profit  without  and  with  USO  (including 
compensation) is supposed to equal the difference in its competitor’s. 
Criterion 4a: The absolute difference in profit levels is supposed to be the same: 
 
With a pay or play mechanism, the tax rate is determined as: 
 
With a compensation fund, it is 
 
 
Criterion 4b: The percentage difference in profit levels is supposed to be the same: 
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With a compensation fund, it is 
 
Table 4 shows the operators’ profit levels resulting from a compensation of the USO net 
cost according to criteria 4a and 4b. 
m  USP profit    Competitor profit   
ext     
pop ex ante     
fund ex ante     
a) pop ex post     
a) fund ex post     
b) pop ex post     
b) fund ex post     
Table 4: Results for criterion 4 – relative difference in profit levels. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of profits between the USP and its competitor resulting 
from a compensation of the USO net costs according to criterion  4.27 From an ex ante 
perspective and with a pay or play mechanism, the USO net costs are fully borne by the 
competitor. With a compensation fund designed from an ex post p erspective, the USP 
shares the burden and it bears more if the percentage difference in profits is the relevant 
measure due to its profits being higher than the competitor’s in a rage of low net costs. 
The higher the net costs are, the closer the two profit levels become after compensation. 
The  shaded  area  in  Figure  6  shows  the  range  of  net  cost  which  represents  an  unfair 
burden  from  an  ex  ante  perspective.  Concretely,  the  net  cost  is  considered  an  unfair 
burden for all values of  . Hence from an ex ante perspective, any positive net cost 
represents an unfair burden. 
                                                       
27 Again, parameter values are:  ,   and on the horizontal axis  . The profit levels with 
external funding are not displayed as they are obviously constant in changes of   (cf. Table 4). 17 
 
Figure 6: Profits resulting from a net cost compensation according to criterion 4. 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed four different criteria by which the (un)fairness of a 
burden  could  be  assessed  and  by  which  the  appropriateness  and  the  level  of 
compensation  may  be  determined.  Based  on  a  stylized  theoretical  model  with 
endogenous market entry and coverage, we have demonstrated the impact of these four 
criteria  to  the  ‚unfairness‛  of  the  burden  represented  by  the  USO  net  costs  on  the 
competitive equilibrium and the resulting distribution of profits among the operators. 
This provides policy makers with a guide towards the implementation of a compensation 
or cost sharing mechanism in the postal sector. 
A priori, none of the criteria outlined above is superior to the others. The choice of a 
criterion is to be based on equity rather than on efficiency considerations.28 In general, 
each of them results in a different distribution of profits. The choice of one among the 
others is therefore to be oriented on the goals to be reached by the compensation.  
Sequentially calculating the net costs of USO, determining whether there is an unfair 
burden  and  then finding  a financing  mechanism  in  general  (and from  an ex  post 
perspective) does not result in  the distribution of profits  sought after. Specifically, the 
implementation of a compensation fund to which all operators contribute results  in a 
systematic undercompensation of the USP  in almost all regimes. Hence, an integrated 
approach is necessary to cope with this issue. 
The analysis also points to the information needs associated with a compensation of the 
USP. A separation accounts between USO and non-USO products – as envisaged by the 
Third Postal Directive – may neither be necessary nor appropriate to determine the correct 
compensation. 
The  incentive  issues  of  universal  service  costing  and  financing  are  imminent  in  the 
compensation problem. In principle, they can be dealt with the same way as in incentive-
compatible price-cap regulation: by determining the amount of compensation ex ante for 
                                                       
28 In general, the choice of the fairness criterion also yields efficiency effects (cf. e.g. Jaag et al., 2009). However, 
in the model used in this paper, there are no allocative effects of the compensation mechanism and hence 
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a number of years and thereby restoring the operators as residual claimants of their efforts 
to be efficient. 
Our analysis is based on a very stylized model. Asymmetries in the operators’ technology 
or specific customer preferences towards one of the operators are not considered. Neither 
are alternative bases for contributions of postal operators to a USO fund. These would not 
only yield distributional effects but also affect the equilibrium allocation in the postal 
sector. The consideration of these issues as well as an implementation of such models 
when determining the appropriate compensation of unfair burdens in real postal markets 
is left to future research. 
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